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Comment 
HERRING V. UNITED STATES:  A THREAT TO 
FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS?† 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Fourth Amendment protects privacy by forbidding 
unreasonable searches and seizures without a warrant.1  The Fourth 
Amendment grew out of the colonists’ experience with excessive 
searches and seizures, which the English used as tools of censorship and 
tyranny.2  Over time, the Supreme Court of the United States developed 
the exclusionary rule as a response to Fourth Amendment violations.3  
The Court has shaped the rule by defining exceptions that limit its 
application.4  One limitation the Court has established is the good-faith 
exception, which seeks to minimize the social costs5 of exclusion by 
allowing evidence when law enforcement officials conduct 
unconstitutional searches and seizures in good faith.6  In Herring v. 
                                                 
† Winner of the 2009 Valparaiso University Law Review Case Comment Competition. 
1 The Fourth Amendment states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
2 Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio:  The Origins, Development and Future of the 
Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1371 (1983).  Stewart 
outlines the history of searches and seizures grounded in the English general warrant and 
writ of assistance, which were viewed as a threat to individual liberty.  Id. at 1369–71.  
Stewart suggests that this perspective led the Framers to craft the Fourth Amendment.  Id. 
3 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655–56 (1961) (establishing the exclusionary rule as 
mandatory); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (forbidding use of improperly 
obtained evidence at trial).  See generally Stewart, supra note 2, at 1372–77 (summarizing the 
slow progression of jurisprudence that led to Weeks). 
4 See Elizabeth Canter, Note, A Fourth Amendment Metamorphosis:  How Fourth 
Amendment Remedies and Regulations Facilitated the Expansion of the Threshold Inquiry, 95 VA. 
L. REV. 155, 177–85 (2009) (discussing the constraints upon the exclusionary rule that 
developed after Weeks). 
5  See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 257–58 (1983) (describing the cost of exclusion as 
denying “the jury access to clearly probative and reliable evidence”); United States v. 
Payner, 477 U.S. 727, 734 (1980) (viewing exclusion as an impediment to the judicial fact-
finding process); People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926) (describing the social costs 
of exclusion as letting the criminal “go free because the constable has blundered”). 
6 See Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1995) (recognizing the good-faith exception 
applied to errors of judicial personnel); Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 349–50 (1987) 
(applying exception to warrantless searches in reliance on a statute); United States v. Leon, 
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United States, the Court granted certiorari to interpret the application of 
the exclusionary rule to a Fourth Amendment violation resulting from 
negligent police record-keeping.7  Weighing the deterrent effect of 
exclusion against the social costs of suppressing the evidence, the Court 
held, in a five-to-four decision, that the evidence should not be 
suppressed because exclusion would not meaningfully deter merely 
negligent clerical conduct of police personnel.8 
This Comment first presents the facts of Herring v. United States.9  
Next, this Comment outlines the legal background supporting Herring.10  
Lastly, this Comment analyzes the Court’s decision in Herring and 
assesses the current and future status of the exclusionary rule.11 
II.  STATEMENT OF THE FACTS IN HERRING V. UNITED STATES 
In July, 2004, Bennie Dean Herring (“Herring”), a convicted felon, 
drove to an Alabama Sherriff’s Department to recover an item from his 
impounded car.12  An investigator had the county warrant clerk search 
for outstanding warrants for Herring; when none were found, the clerk 
contacted her counterpart in a neighboring county.13  The other clerk 
found an active arrest warrant for Herring in the database, which was 
relayed to the investigator.14  After requesting a copy of the warrant be 
faxed to him, the investigator and a deputy immediately pursued 
Herring and arrested him, which led to the discovery of 
methamphetamine in his pocket and a pistol in his car.15 
                                                                                                             
468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984) (establishing exception if police act “in objectively reasonable 
reliance” on invalid warrant); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 542 (1975) (“[Evidence] 
should be suppressed only if . . . the law enforcement officer had knowledge . . . that the 
search was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.”). 
7 129 S. Ct. 695, 699 (2009).  The majority also indicated that the Court’s holding would 
resolve any conflict among jurisdictions.  Id.  Compare United States v. Herring, 492 F.3d 
1212 (11th Cir. 2007) (denying Herring’s motion to suppress illegally obtained evidence), 
with Hoay v. State, 71 S.W.3d 573 (Ark. 2002) (excluding illegally obtained evidence as 
result of police clerical error). 
8 Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 702. 
9 See infra Part II (laying out the pertinent facts of Herring v. United States). 
10 See infra Part III (explaining the development of the exclusionary rule as a judicially 
created mechanism for enforcing Fourth Amendment rights). 
11 See infra Parts IV.A–B (analyzing the Herring decision and discussing its impact on the 
Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence). 
12 Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 698. 
13 Id.  Herring’s brief suggested that the investigator sought to arrest Herring for 
personal reasons because he had information to connect Herring to a local murder.  Id. at 
705 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
14 Id. at 698. 
15 Id. 
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Shortly after Herring’s arrest, the investigator learned that the 
warrant was invalid because a clerical error in the neighboring county 
prevented the database from being updated.16  Yet, Herring was still 
indicted for illegal possession of the gun and methamphetamine.17  
Before trial, Herring moved to suppress the evidence on Fourth 
Amendment grounds.18  The trial court denied the motion based on the 
investigator’s good-faith reliance on the warrant.19  The Eleventh Circuit 
affirmed and held that the error was merely negligent, not deliberate, 
and the deterrent benefit of exclusion would be marginal or 
nonexistent.20  The Supreme Court then granted certiorari.21 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND OF HERRING V. UNITED STATES 
The Fourth Amendment allows governmental searches and seizures 
only when proper measures are taken to protect the privacy rights of 
citizens.22  In 1914, the Supreme Court established the exclusionary rule 
when it suppressed illegally obtained evidence in Weeks v. United States.23  
Weeks is the starting point in the evolution of exclusionary rule 
jurisprudence.24 
In 1949, the Court in Wolf v. Colorado described the exclusionary rule 
as only one of the effective remedies available to the states to protect 
Fourth Amendment rights, and did not extend the rule to the states.25  In 
1961, however, Wolf was overruled by Mapp v. Ohio.26  In Mapp, the Court 
                                                 
16 Id. 
17 Id. at 699.  18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006) prohibits possession of a firearm by a convicted 
felon.  21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (2006) prohibits possession of illegal drugs such as 
methamphetamine. 
18 Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 699. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21 Id.  See supra note 7 and accompanying text (explaining the Court’s rationale for 
granting certiorari). 
22 See supra note 1 (presenting text of the Fourth Amendment). 
23 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914).  In Weeks, police violated the Fourth Amendment by invading 
Weeks’s home without a warrant and confiscating his personal belongings.  Id. at 387–88.  
Police improperly retained part of the property to use at trial.  Id. at 388.  The Court 
excluded the evidence because if it had been returned, it would have been unavailable at 
trial.  Id. at 398. 
24 See Stewart, supra note 2, at 1380–89 (discussing three possible constitutional bases for 
exclusion:  (1) the Constitution itself; (2) the government’s interest in preserving its 
integrity by preventing courts from reviewing tainted evidence and committing a second 
Fourth Amendment violation; and (3) a constitutionally required remedy because it is the 
only effective incentive for Fourth Amendment compliance). 
25 338 U.S. 25, 27, 31 (1949). 
26 367 U.S. 643, 655–56 (1961).  In Mapp, a woman was arrested, tried, and convicted of 
possessing obscene materials, which were seized by police when they forced themselves 
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held “that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of 
the Constitution [was][] . . . inadmissible,” which solidified the rule 
announced in Weeks as the constitutionally required remedy for Fourth 
Amendment violations.27  Then, in 1974, the Court decided United States 
v. Calandra, which resulted in a shift from exclusion as the rule to 
exclusion as the exception, applicable only when it achieved a deterrent 
effect.28 
In subsequent cases, the Court limited exclusion to cases of flagrant, 
official misconduct.29  The Court eroded the exclusionary rule further by 
affording deference to magistrates in determining probable cause and to 
police officers acting without warrants.30  Then, in 1984, the Court in 
United States v. Leon established the good-faith exception, which 
prevented exclusion unless it achieved a substantial deterrent effect.31  
The Court reasoned that when an agent of the State conducted a search 
that reasonably relied on an invalid warrant, the deterrent effect of 
exclusion was minimal and insufficient to outweigh its social costs.32  
Thus, Leon defined the good-faith exception and the balancing test that 
would later support the majority opinion in Herring.33 
After Leon, the Court applied the good-faith exception to cases 
involving judicial and legislative errors.34  In 1995, Arizona v. Evans 
                                                                                                             
into her home without a warrant claiming to be searching for a bombing suspect.  Id. at 
644–45.  Mapp also applied the exclusionary rule to the states.  Id. at 655. 
27 Id. at 655–56. 
28 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (describing the exclusionary rule as a judicially created 
remedy to “safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect”).  
See also Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960) (“The [exclusionary] rule is 
calculated to prevent, not to repair.  Its purpose is to deter—to compel respect for the 
constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way—by removing the incentive to 
disregard it.”). 
29 See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155–56 (1978) (finding negligent police 
miscommunications insufficient to invalidate a search); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 
(1976) (requiring deterrent effect before excluding illegally obtained evidence at trial); 
United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 (1976) (applying the exclusionary rule only when it 
resulted in “appreciable deterrence[]”); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 610–11 (1975); 
United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 542 (1975) (applying the exclusionary rule only if the 
State agent had knowledge that the search was illegal). 
30 See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996) (affording deference to police 
officers);  Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983) (requiring deference to magistrates). 
31 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984).  In Leon, a police officer executed a facially valid search 
warrant that led to an arrest and the seizure of large quantities of illegal drugs.  Id. at 902.  
The trial court found no probable cause to support the warrant, yet determined that the 
officer acted in good-faith.  Id. at 903. 
32 Id. at 919 (citing Peltier, 422 U.S. at 539 ; Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974)). 
33 Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 699–701 (2009). 
34 See supra note 6 (citing cases where the Court applied the exclusionary rule to errors 
committed by judicial and legislative personnel). 
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applied the good-faith exception to the errors of court clerical 
personnel,35 but refused to decide whether the exception applied to 
errors committed by police personnel.36  The Court reasoned that the 
exclusionary rule sought to curb police misconduct, not judicial 
misconduct; that court employees were unlikely to intentionally violate 
the Fourth Amendment; and that nothing suggested exclusion of the 
evidence would deter similar errors.37  Justice O’Connor noted in a 
concurring opinion, however, that systemic or recurring clerical errors 
should trigger exclusion.38 
In 2006, the Court considered the exclusionary rule again in Hudson 
v. Michigan and held that a violation of the “knock-and-announce” rule 
did not require exclusion.39  Justice Scalia, writing for the majority in the 
five-to-four decision, depicted the exclusionary rule as a last resort, not a 
first impulse in response to Fourth Amendment violations.40  Justice 
Scalia also emphasized the increasing professionalism of police forces, 
which implied that the exclusionary rule’s success made it less 
necessary.41  Justice Kennedy, however, intentionally stated in his 
concurring opinion that “the continued operation of the exclusionary 
rule[] . . . is not in doubt.”42  In his dissent, Justice Breyer defended the 
exclusionary rule as the primary tool for enforcing Fourth Amendment 
rights.43  It was upon this stage of intra-Court dissonance regarding 
                                                 
35 514 U.S. 1, 16 (1995).  In Evans, a policeman arrested Evans based on a warrant found 
in the police database and seized marijuana from his car.  Id. at 4.  Evans sought exclusion 
of the evidence because the warrant had been quashed before the arrest.  Id.  A court clerk’s 
error had prevented the police database from being updated to reflect the change.  Id. at 5. 
36 Id. at 16 n.5. 
37 Id. at 15–16. 
38 Id. at 16–17.  But see 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE:  A TREATISE ON THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT § 1.8(e) (2004) (arguing that the Court in Evans should have focused 
on systemic deterrence rather than specific deterrence of particular players within the 
criminal justice system). 
39 547 U.S. 586, 588 (2006).  
40 Id. at 591. 
41 Id. at 598–99.  But see Craig M. Bradley, Red Herring or the Death of the Exclusionary 
Rule?, 45 TRIAL 52, 54 (2009) (commenting on the public’s instinct to trust police too much); 
Stewart, supra note 2, at 1389 (stating that the only effective remedy to inspire police 
officers to control their professional zeal and to avoid violations of the Fourth Amendment 
is the exclusionary rule); Note, Retreat:  The Supreme Court and the New Police, 122 HARV. L. 
REV. 1706 (2009) [hereinafter Retreat] (arguing against the easing of police regulation and 
suggesting that improved professionalism makes it easier for the police to better 
regulation, such as the exclusionary rule). 
42 Hudson, 547 U.S. at 603 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment).  See Bradley, supra note 41, at 53 (labeling Kennedy as the critical fifth vote in 
favor of keeping the exclusionary rule alive). 
43 Hudson, 547 U.S. at 630 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and a weakening exclusionary rule 
that Bennie Dean Herring entered. 
IV.  ANALYSIS OF HERRING V. UNITED STATES 
A. The Herring Opinion 
In granting certiorari in Herring v. United States, the Supreme Court 
cited its intent to resolve a circuit split regarding the application of the 
exclusionary rule to police personnel errors.44  Many wonder if the 
Court’s intent was truly that narrow or if the Court used the case to 
move toward overruling Mapp or eliminating the exclusionary rule 
altogether.45  On its face, the Herring decision did not overturn Mapp, but 
extended the good-faith exception by finding that the marginal 
deterrence achieved by excluding evidence based on negligent police 
error was not sufficient to overcome the social costs of exclusion.46 
Chief Justice Roberts opened by introducing important premises of 
the Court’s decision.47  First, Chief Justice Roberts accepted the parties’ 
assumptions that Herring’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated.48  
Next, Chief Justice Roberts used Supreme Court precedent to establish 
the principle that exclusion of evidence is not guaranteed in the event of 
a Fourth Amendment violation.49  Chief Justice Roberts then agreed with 
the Eleventh Circuit and identified the nature of the police misconduct in 
Herring as merely negligent.50 
Endorsing Hudson’s holding that exclusion is a last resort, Chief 
Justice Roberts reviewed the established constraints on the exclusionary 
                                                 
44 Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 699 (2009).  See also supra note 7 (noting that 
the Court also sought to resolve a split on the issue among the federal circuits). 
45 See Canter, supra note 4, at 202 (questioning whether Herring will “erode the 
exclusionary rule as substantially as its rhetoric suggests”); Todd C. Berg, Ruling by U.S. 
Supreme Court May Extend Beyond ‘Good Faith’ Cases, MICH. LAWYER’S WEEKLY, Feb. 9, 2009, 
available at 2009 WLNR 7602532 (noting that criminal law specialists view Herring as more 
than mere interpretation of the good-faith exception); Bradley supra note 41, at 52; Adam 
Cohen, Is the Supreme Court About to Kill Off the Exclusionary Rule?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2009, 
at A22, available at 2009 WLNR 3010228 (describing a memo written during the Reagan 
administration by Chief Justice Roberts supporting elimination of the exclusionary rule); 
Barry Kamins, The Exclusionary Rule:  Beginning of the End?, 241 N.Y. L. J. 3 (Apr. 6, 2009) 
(considering whether Herring extended Evans or set the stage for overturning Mapp). 
46 Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 704. 
47 Id. at 699–700 (Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito joined Chief Justice 
Roberts’ majority opinion). 
48 Id. at 699.  Chief Justice Roberts questioned this assumption, however, and briefly 
commented that some searches based on faulty probable cause determinations would not 
constitute a constitutional violation.  Id. 
49 Id. (tracing this concept from Weeks through Calandra, Leon, and Evans). 
50 Id. at 700. 
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rule in order to ascertain its applicability to Herring’s case.51  First, Chief 
Justice Roberts affirmed deterrence of police misconduct as the goal of 
the exclusionary rule.52  Chief Justice Roberts then validated the 
deterrence standard enunciated in Leon that exclusion applied only when 
appreciable deterrence can be achieved.53  Chief Justice Roberts rated the 
social costs of exclusion as very high, which made the standards of 
appreciable deterrence even higher when considering exclusion.54  Chief 
Justice Roberts proffered as evidence of this standard the Court’s good-
faith exception to the exclusionary rule, which was formulated in Leon, 
Krull, and Evans, and was based on the  lack of significant deterrent effect 
the exclusionary rule had on judicial personnel and legislatures.55 
Second, Chief Justice Roberts incorporated the culpability of law 
enforcement conduct into the exclusionary rule analysis.56  Chief Justice 
Roberts concurred with the Court that exclusion is most effective in 
response to flagrant Fourth Amendment abuses.57  Noting that the Court 
never applied the exclusionary rule to a case of nonrecurring, attenuated 
negligence,58 the Chief Justice concluded that a “flagrant or deliberate 
violation of rights[,]” not mere negligent behavior, was required to 
trigger the exclusionary rule.59  Furthermore, Chief Justice Roberts 
addressed two misconceptions about exclusionary rule analysis.  First, 
Chief Justice Roberts clarified that analysis of deterrence and culpability 
was an objective inquiry.60  And, second, the Chief Justice refuted the 
implication that all record-keeping errors by police were immune from 
exclusion.61  Finally, Chief Justice Roberts confronted Justice Ginsburg’s 
concern about unreliable databases62 and conceded that routine errors or 
                                                 
51 Id. at 700–03. 
52 Id. at 700. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 700–01.  Chief Justice Roberts addressed the social costs standard in light of the 
Leon balancing test weighing the deterrent benefits of exclusion against its social costs to 
determine the exclusionary rule’s applicability.  See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 
920–22 (1984). 
55 Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 701.  See supra notes 6, 34–37 and accompanying text.  
56 Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 701–02. 
57 Id. at 702.   
58 Id. 
59 Id.  Chief Justice Roberts conceded that liability for negligence deters misconduct, but 
contended its irrelevance because the deterrent effect of exclusion on negligent misconduct 
did not outweigh its social costs.  Id. at n.4. 
60 Id. at 703 (responding to the claim that investigator that arrested Herring had an 
ulterior motive in arresting Herring). 
61 Id. 
62 See infra note 69 and accompanying text (citing statistics suggestive of unreliable 
government databases). 
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patterns of Fourth Amendment violations by police record-keeping staff 
were worthy of exclusion.63 
Ultimately, the Court did not apply the exclusionary rule, and 
Herring’s conviction was affirmed.64  After balancing the deterrent effect 
of exclusion against the social costs to the justice system, the Court 
concluded that the negligent police conduct that Herring experienced 
did not generate sufficient deterrence to “‘pay its way’” and did not 
involve any “systemic error or reckless disregard of constitutional 
requirements.”65 
In dissent,66 Justice Ginsburg argued that negligent record-keeping 
by police personnel threatened individual liberty, can be deterred, and 
lacked effective remedies besides exclusion.67  Justice Ginsburg 
advocated for a forceful exclusionary rule to adequately protect Fourth 
Amendment rights.68  Additionally, Justice Ginsburg described modern 
technology as pervasive and unreliable,69 which created a palpable threat 
to individual liberty.70  Noting the deterrent effect of tort liability for 
negligence, Justice Ginsburg concluded that exclusion could—and 
must—deter negligent record-keeping errors.71  Justice Ginsburg rejected 
                                                 
63 Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 704 (citing concurring opinions in Evans and Hudson). 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 Id.  Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer joined Justice Ginsburg’s dissent.  Justice 
Breyer, joined by Justice Souter, dissented separately arguing that the good-faith exception 
should only apply to non-police errors resulting in constitutional violations.  Id. at 710–11 
(Breyer, J., dissenting). 
67 Id. at 710 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  Justice Ginsburg adopted “‘a more majestic 
conception’” of the exclusionary rule as protecting privacy rights and limiting the 
tyrannical power of the government, not just its agents.  Id. at 707 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
Chief Justice Roberts dismissed Justice Ginsburg’s dissent because she relied 
predominantly on dissenting opinions and secondary material.  Id. at 700 n.2. 
68 Id. at 706–07 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Justice Brennan’s dissent in Calandra that 
described the goals of exclusion to be deterrence of official misconduct, judicial collusion 
with official lawlessness, and promotion of public trust in government by assuring citizens 
that constitutional violations will not be tolerated).  See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13 
(1968) (explaining that admitting evidence at trial “legitimize[d] the conduct” used to seize 
the evidence, thus requiring exclusion in cases of misconduct to avoid blessing the 
violation with official approval). 
69 Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 708–09 nn.3–5 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (supporting her claim 
with government statistics highlighting flaws in terrorist watch-list databases, government 
employment verification systems, and criminal databases).  See generally 122 HARV. L. REV. 
1706, supra note 40 and accompanying text (discussing the effect of modernizing and 
professionalizing police forces). 
70 Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 709 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (depicting an innocent citizen being 
stripped of his or her dignity by an illegal search caused by a public employee's database 
management error). 
71 Id. at 708 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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the result of weakening the exclusionary rule—leaving citizens with no 
effective remedy to Fourth Amendment violations.72 
B. Appraisal of the Exclusionary Rule and Its Future Post-Herring 
Although seemingly on shaky ground, the exclusionary rule still 
exists post-Herring.  Adhering to exclusionary rule precedent, the 
majority in Herring focused on balancing deterrence and social costs 
while clarifying the role of culpability in the analysis, which implies the 
vitality of the rule.73  Yet, underneath the majority’s holding lies a 
conflicted Court74 and hints that the exclusionary rule is not as necessary 
as it once was, suggesting Herring has broader implications on the 
exclusionary rule.75  Omission of pertinent discussions reveals the 
majority’s broader goals. 
For example, the Court dismisses Mapp’s formative role in the 
history of the exclusionary rule by omitting reference to its holding that 
all illegally-obtained evidence is inadmissible in court.76  While the 
majority correctly respects modifications to Mapp’s holding through the 
good-faith exception, it fails to consider the full stature of the Fourth 
Amendment’s constitutional guarantee that the exclusionary rule serves 
to ensure.77  Additionally, the majority’s focus on deterrence as the sole 
purpose of the exclusionary rule ignores the value of excluding evidence 
to protect the integrity of the government.78  Calculating the social costs 
of exclusion, Chief Justice Roberts also neglects the cost of public distrust 
                                                 
72 Id. at 709 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (finding the following limitations to an effective 
remedy:  (1) official immunity precluding a remedy through 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006), (2) 
lack of any incentive for police to improve databases, and (3) insurmountable burden of 
proof necessary for defendants to qualify for exclusion). 
73 Id. at 704. 
74 In both Herring and Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006), the Court returned five-
to-four decisions with Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and 
Alito constituting the majorities and Justices Stevens, Breyer, Souter, and Ginsburg 
comprising the dissents.  See generally, Kamins, supra note 45 (discussing Justice Kennedy’s 
role in limiting the majority’s ability to eliminate the exclusionary rule). 
75 Supra note 41 and accompanying text (citing Justice Scalia’s suggestion in Hudson that 
police professionalism makes civil liability sufficient as an incentive for officers to avoid 
Fourth Amendment violations and presenting perspectives that challenge Justice Scalia’s 
conclusions about how police officers behave). 
76 Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 699–700.  See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). 
77 Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655 (extending the exclusionary rule to the States and asserting the 
need to protect the constitutional right of privacy equallyagainst the Federal Government 
and the States given the incorporation of the Fourth Amendment through the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
78 See id. at 659 (citing Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960)); United States v. 
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 357 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13 
(1968); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).  
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of the government that results from the good-faith exception.  By 
ignoring this “‘more majestic conception’” of exclusion,79 the majority 
implies a prioritization of police interests over individual liberties.  
Similarly, while the majority’s analysis announces a general approach to 
determining the applicability of exclusion,80 it relies on established 
standards of deference81 without acknowledging them or the resulting 
increased burden of proof required to support exclusion.82  The Court’s 
deferential approach and the increased burden of proof ultimately 
eliminate any effective remedy for Fourth Amendment violations.83  
Again, these omissions by the majority appear to dismiss any concern for 
Fourth Amendment rights. 
Taken together, these unspoken statements by the majority indicate 
an underlying intent to eliminate the exclusionary rule.84  Justice Scalia’s 
announcement in Hudson that increased police professionalism reduced 
the need for the exclusionary rule adds credibility to this suggestion.85  
Yet, it is not the potential loss of the exclusionary rule that needs to be 
mourned, but the impending demise of the Fourth Amendment looming 
post-Herring.  Decreased exclusion of illegally obtained evidence 
undermines individual liberties and buttresses police power.86  The risks 
of tyrannical power emerging from such a scenario led the Framers to 
craft the Constitution and Bill of Rights as guarantees of individual 
                                                 
79 Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 700 n.2. 
80 See Bradley, supra note 41, at 53.  
81 See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
82 See Berg, supra note 45, paras. 14–15 (asserting that Herring could make life easier for 
prosecutors by decreasing the number of cases where deliberate constitutional violations 
could be proven); Stewart, supra note 2, at 1403 (predicting that a good-faith exception to 
the exclusionary rule would shift the police’s attention to what courts will allow rather 
than what the Fourth Amendment requires, making it easier for police to avoid exclusion). 
83 Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 709–10 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  See Canter, supra note 4, at 179–
83 (describing the contraction of the exclusionary rule resulting from deferential standards 
toward local judges and police); Stewart, supra note 2, at 1389 (concluding that the 
exclusionary rule represents the only effective remedy to Fourth Amendment violations). 
84 See Cohen, supra note 45, at A22 (“[C]ritics of the exclusionary rule have high hopes 
that the Roberts [C]ourt will take the ultimate step of overruling Mapp v. Ohio.”); Kamins, 
supra note 45, at 3 (stating that some believe that “Herring has established a foundation for 
the Court to chip away at the exclusionary rule over an extended period of time.”). 
85 See supra note 41 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Scalia’s emphasis on 
increased police professionalism in Hudson and offering alternative perspectives on the 
resulting need for the exclusionary rule). 
86 See Bradley, supra note 41, at 54 (criticizing Herring’s general attack on exclusion); 
Retreat, supra note 41, at 1727 (arguing that if the police “‘capture’ the judiciary,” a police 
state is likely to result). 
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liberties.87  Should Herring lead to continuing erosion of the exclusionary 
rule, a return to the constitutional abuses of the past could follow.88 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Herring, although commendable for its loyalty to precedent, 
espouses flawed reasoning and incomplete consideration of public 
policy relative to the protection of constitutional rights.  Consequently, 
the future of the exclusionary rule remains unclear.  Given the current 
make up of the Court, the exclusionary rule is not likely to disappear 
soon.  Nevertheless, Herring symbolizes a step onto a slippery slope 
necessitating renewed commitment to the foundational liberties 
established in the Fourth Amendment, so as to avoid the risk of tyranny 
that any future restrictions of the rule may create.  If the exclusionary 
rule is at risk, an alternative remedy that effectively ensures law 
enforcement’s adherence to the Constitution is needed to protect the 
valued right to privacy enshrined in the Fourth Amendment.89 
Candace C. Kilpinen* 
                                                 
87 See Stewart, supra note 2, at 1369–71 (tracing the Revolutionary history of the United 
States that resulted in the adoption of the Fourth Amendment in the Bill of Rights); Retreat, 
supra note 41, at 1727 (“If the police could . . . ‘capture’ the judiciary[,]” or in other words, 
eliminate the exclusionary rule, “the resulting system would be truly suggestive of a police 
state.” (quoting JEROME H. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL:  LAW ENFORCEMENT IN A 
DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 72 (3d ed. 1994))). 
88  See sources cited supra note 87 (implying the risk of tyranny associated with any 
failure by the Court to effectively protect citizens from violations of the Fourth 
Amendment). 
89 See Stewart, supra note 2, at 1397 (measuring proposals to amend or abolish the 
exclusionary rule by a standard that ensures protection of Fourth Amendment rights 
through sufficiently effective alternative remedies). 
*  J.D. Candidate, Valparaiso University School of Law (2011); B.A., History, Valparaiso 
University (1989).  I wish to thank my husband, Jon, and children, Jenna and Jon, for 
sacrificing to make my law school journey a reality.  And I thank my parents for instilling 
in me the values of tenacity, hope, and integrity that guide me. 
Kilpinen: Herring v. United States:  A Threat to Fourth Amendment Rights?
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2010
